Net Neutrality: No Easy Answers

Comment piece for Media International Australia, June 2006.
http://www.emsah.uq.edu.au/mia/
Pre-print, please do not cite or quote without permission.

Danny Butt, Suma Media Consulting

The concept of “Network Neutrality” has received a great deal of attention in the press recently, mostly due to so-far unsuccessful US telecommunications legislation proposals that required Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to carry any and all Internet traffic equally, rather than being able to prioritise certain traffic or charge differential rates for different kinds of content.

For the proponents of Net Neutrality, there has been and should be a clear separation between the provision of physical network infrastructure and the provision of content. Much as in the telephone system, the ISPs should be treated as “common carriers” which are in the business of providing access to all content on the Internet. In the U.S., for example, legislation until recently required cable television providers to carry all content packages and provide the latest technologies in all areas they served, even if it would be more economically efficient to provide only those content packages with which they had direct relationships. The policy justification for legislating for this openness springs from the limited competition in the telco/ISP/broadband area, meaning that users don’t have true competition due to high switching costs and limited choice.

Net Neutrality proponents wish to see something similar for the Internet: a requirement that all ISPs provide access to all content on the Internet without different charges or reduced performance for content not approved or owned by the ISP itself. They want to see ISPs continue to charge purely on speed and volume rather than providing some services for free/cheap and making others more expensive.

At first glance, the issue seems like a straightforward benefit for consumers, worthy of public policy interventions. But for the ISPs and the providers of network services, different issues are at play that make it less simple. The Internet has transformed from a research network focussed on text and file transfer, to a highly flexible media and communications platform capable of emulating both the phone system and cable television. There are business pressures for ISPs to implement differential provision policies for Internet traffic for two reasons.

Firstly, Quality of Service (QoS) policies are required to prioritise important, time-sensitive traffic over less important traffic, when there are more requests than there is bandwidth available. For example, if you are video-conferencing, where maintenance of a certain data rate is necessary for uninterrupted viewing, under busy traffic conditions ISPs would like to be able to ensure you can see your conference uninterrupted, even if it slows down the person downloading a copy of a software programme next door. Similarly, if you are using Skype or a similar Voice-over-IP application to have an audio conversation, you would like to think that this could work even if you next door neighbour is downloading movies via a peer-to-peer file sharing application, where a few seconds delay is not going to make a difference to their experience. In Australia and New Zealand, a number of ISPs have already undertaken “bandwidth shaping” trials, or limiting the availability of bandwidth to traffic on common “ports” used by peer-to-peer applications.

In these examples, “non-neutral policies” that prioritise some types of traffic over others are an essential part of giving the customer what they want. The problem is that what constitutes benefit for the customer and benefit for the ISP’s bottom line becomes blurred. This is the case when, for example, the ISP is also a telecommunications provider, and the extensive use of VoIP may be cannibalising their phone revenues, and the suppression of this traffic for “QoS purposes” just happens to reduce take up of VoIP. Or the ISP has a relationship with a content producer (e.g. major record labels), in which case preventing peer-to-peer traffic may play a role in encouraging users to download the music content on the ISP’s website.

Differentiating between QoS discrimination for valid or anti-competitive reasons becomes even more difficult when next generation networks offer a “triple play” of voice, Internet, and movies from one provider. In this case, the ability to deliver specialised content services becomes part of the value proposition for the network, and motivates the consumer to purchase these services. Some ISPs argue that without the ability to guarantee certain use patterns they will not be able to fund the new networks and innovative services. For example, they would say, if you were considering signing up with ISP X for voice/Internet/movies, but read a review that their reliability on voice was not 100%, this would inhibit takeup of these new services.

While many small producers and consumer rights advocates (and large web companies who are not reliant on deals with highly branded content industries) have promoted Net Neutrality as equivalent to the deals between cable television networks and content providers, there are more complex interactions between content and infrastructure as intensive interactive traffic becomes the norm. In particular some of the new functionality such as that found in interactive television and gaming relies on a sophisticated relationship between content and hardware.

A useful analogy can be seen in the gaming console market, where the console manufacturers need to innovate at a hardware level as well as negotiate deals with content providers to create a portfolio of available titles [1]. By maintaining licensing control over who can develop titles, console manufacturers are able to capture up to a third of the retail value of each game sold, and this is integral to their profits. This is crucial because price pressure on consoles means that the profit margin on the hardware console is low. For console manufacturers, a suggestion that they should all be able to play each others’ games is infeasible.

The Internet, and the World Wide Web in particular was developed around a separation of traffic protocols, user environment, and content formats. Part of what made the web so ubiquitous was that you could view content on any operating system (Windows, Unix, Mac), via any browser (Netscape, Internet Explorer), over any kind of Internet connection (modem, LAN, wireless). This is what allowed the network to have a sense of neutrality.

However, the shift in the web from a predominantly text-based asynchronous information exchange platform, to sophisticated real-time applications (audio-visual media in particular), have resulted in more diverse, often proprietary platforms that link content, transport, and interface in new ways. Examples include the Windows Media Center, or Apples FairPlay DRM format/iPod hardware/iTunes software. This shift is driven by a combination of user-experience requirements (users expect integration) and an attempt to gain control of the hardware-software environment for areas of growth content to allow multiple revenue streams and brand control, along the lines of the console model. The degree to which this is a prerequisite for network innovation or constitutes anti-competitive behaviour is an policy question whose dimensions are complex and with remedies which are unclear.

A further complicating factor is that the highly branded content (music, movies) that is driving uptake of high-speed data services predominantly comes from offline sources where distributors not only controlled, but usually financed production. This is a very different model from the early Internet, where content was sometimes funded by ecommerce or advertising, but more commonly produced on a non-commercial basis. Or to put it another way, you can’t charge people a premium for much of the text-only internet, but you can for episodes of Desperate Housewives. And if you’re an ISP charging for access to those episodes, you’re probably paying a lot of money for the rights to show them, so you are going to want to prioritise access to those over other video content.

The question of what viable economic models will look like under next-generation networks is central to the Net Neutrality debate. On one hand, it seems unrealistic to expect that the vertically integrated content & distribution model has no place on the Internet - to exclude it by legal means will probably delay the introduction of new, efficient distribution models that users want (see, for example, the role of iTunes in kick-starting the digital music downloads business). But it is also true that the public policy implications of Internet and telephone connectivity are much more substantial than those of a console operator or movie theatre: when people discuss the importance of information-literacy they are not usually talking about access to playing games on an X-Box or being able to watch a Disney film. There is a genuine public need for effective access to email and Internet communications.

Yet in the new Internet networks all these kinds of information are delivered through the same mechanism. A large part of the problem is that people in the US (in particular) assumed that the Internet was public because the protocol for transferring information is public. But the actual physical networks are owned primarily by private entities who interconnect via market transactions and they have many incentives to recoup their investment/seek profit by tying their access offering to what people actually want, i.e. content. Especially when, as Richard Bennett has noted, there is no money to be made in being an ISP without those services, and the Internet backbone providers are almost always telcos who are offsetting their costs with voice services [2].

The business models were different back in the early 1990s when it was primarily research institutions who owned the pipes, but that’s not “neutral” or “public” in the way a government service is public. At least part of the blame for the current predicament can be laid at the feet of the “traditional Internet folks” who avoided government involvement in the Internet like the plague, and believed that a free market was the only way of preserving freedom of expression. A review of the history of other public utilities shows that in a market environment, governments might be the only mechanism that can realistically be subject to effective political influence in the public interest.

In summary, the Net Neutrality issue is not as simple as it might first appear. There could be genuine suppression of innovation from simplistic anti-discrimination legislation, yet imperfect competition is a feature of these networks which requires public policy remedies. The most important activity over the next few years will be clarifying what the most important public benefits of network access are, and developing mechanisms for supporting those benefits. In a rapidly changing network environment, these will need to be more sophisticated than simply arguing for a status quo, or worse, implementing poor legislation that is unresponsive to the business models that will shape the Internet’s future.

Danny Butt is a consultant in new media, culture, and development, and partner at Suma Media Consulting.

[1] For an excellent overview of the value chains in this sector, see Johns J. (2006)“Video games production networks: value capture, power relations and embeddedness.” Journal of Economic Geography 6(2):151-180; doi:10.1093/jeg/lbi001

[2] See comment on Tim Berners-Lee’s weblog: Berners-Lee, T. (2006) “Neutrality of the Net” http ://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/132, Accessed 27th May 2006.

Internet Governance - The Clash of Cultures

Draft of talks given in Australia and New Zealand May 2006 - please do not cite or circulate without permission. You can also hear an MP3 of the Canberra version of this talk (slightly abridged) here (MP3, 57MB) thanks to ANU.

Internet Governance - The Clash of Cultures

Danny Butt - http://www.dannybutt.net

Who has heard of John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace? An influential text in early web culture, it captures the epic mythology of the new online world, one that was critical in forging a collective sense of possibility in the English-speaking settler nations where web fever was catching hold. Barlow was a Wyoming cattle rancher, and for those of us working in the commercial new media industries the Californian Ideology was a Wired Magazine-sponsored rerun of the Wild West’s escape from the limits of government, and from politics.

“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. […]
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here.[…]
You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a world where you will always be immigrants.[…]
In our world, whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish.”

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace 1996

But the electronic frontier is another story. From today’s vantage point, we can simply note that the anti-immigration provisions of Barlow’s declaration haven’t aged so well. And of course, the “global conveyance of thought” precisely requires the factories and labour of those who are not natives in the digital environment, the bulk of which happens to be located in the Asia Pacific. What would it mean to factor the experience of the Asia Pacific into the bodies that structure Internet governance?

I want to leave you in this talk with three things:

  1. Contrary to popular mythology, the Internet is and has always been governed, by both private and governmental actors. As we shall see, one government in particular plays a pivotal role.
  2. The complaints about the existing regimes of Internet governance are substantive. There are many areas where it fails to meet its own principles of openness.
  3. The debate over Internet governance reflects long-held differences in culture and power between the US and its allies, and other parts of the world.

Stories

Let me start with a great story by David Maher, a trademark lawyer who was involved in some of the early discussions behind the setting up of ICANN, the organisation which controls Internet Resources such as domain names and IP addresses. Maher describes going to a “Summit on the Internet” meeting that was hosted by the Internet Society in the early 90s. Maher was there to discuss the problems that the domain name system was facing with cybersquatting and issues around trademark law. Jon Postel, the engineer who was then single-handedly responsible for deciding who could have what domain name, did his best to discourage Maher from speaking, suggesting that Maher could “sit in the audience rather than on the podium, and say something when the others had finished”. The thought of sharing a stage with a “lawyer” was abhorrent to this group, as Maher found out when he was told, “if he wore a suit” to a follow up meeting that “no one would talk to him”. When Maher suggested to the summit that the way that domain names were being handled was on a collision course with trademark law, Vint Cerf, the Chair of ICANN and “grandfather of the Internet”, was apoplectic, saying “How dare you tell us how to run the Internet”. A few years later, ICANN would be working with the World Intellectual Property Organisation to come up with a set of rules about how intellectual property interests would be protected online, so I guess they got over trying to run it themselves.
The reason stories like this are interesting to me is because the world of Internet governance is dominated by engineers, and engineers tend to talk about systems rather than people. Now don’t get me wrong, both systems and engineers are very important. I’ve worked in the new media sector most of my life, and I know intimately how a bad platform or software choice can cause all kinds of grief. However, there is a tendency among systems people to think that success is merely a matter of getting the specifications for the systems right. But when it comes to governance, even on the Internet, we’re talking about people, and people don’t work like systems, and can’t be tested and guaranteed like systems. So the qualities that make a piece of technology function don’t always translate into the real world of humans.

Geeks tend to have a belief in systems that is matched only by neo-classical economists, philosophers and some of the more hardline branches of Marxist political theory. You get the feeling sometimes that the engineers could run a great Internet if it didn’t have all these stupid people on it. That attitude, which is embodied in Maher’s encounter with Cerf, also permeates many of the forums where Internet governance decisions are made. In the Internet world a lot of emphasis gets put on the formal rules of any process, more than what actually happens, and any problems are usually about “people not understanding the systems properly.” It’s the difference between a discussion of democracy that insists that “anyone can be a leader” versus one that discusses how Bush Jr following his Dad into office might not have been a fluke 1 in 200 million chance.

I’ve been involved in Internet projects since 1993, but like most people I’ve only paid partial attention to how the whole thing is organised. This is probably because, as English-speaking person, the setup has worked pretty well for me. But for the last little while I’ve been an anthropologist in the world of international internet governance, and I’ve tried to adopt the perspective of the proverbial alien from outer space - looking at what happens and in particular the gap between the way people talk about power and where power actually lies. What I’ve found is that the world of Internet Governance is a fascinating place filled with very smart, usually well-intentioned people who have no idea how unusual they are in the global scheme of things. And somehow, they ended up being left at the controls of some of the most important infrastructure in the contemporary world.

What is governance?

What do we mean by governance? Often people think of it as being synonymous with “government”, but it’s more than that. Governance can be defined as comprising the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how stakeholders are given a voice, and how decisions are made. This can be in the private sector (“corporate governance”) or the public sector. Note that there are formal and informal aspects to governance - the gap between these will be a theme for the talk.
One of the biggest myths about the Internet, as my colleague Ang Peng Hwa puts it in the book, is that it isn’t governed. Technically, you can say that the Internet is coordinated rather than governed, and it is true that there is no one place where you can go to and say - there’s the Internet. But in reality, there are a number of different areas where self or state regulation is in place, and these are areas where the analysis of governance is useful.

Three areas of governance

The UN Working Group on Internet Governance differentiated clusters of issues related to Internet Governance - there are a lot of them and they’re outlined in the book. I’d summarise them as 1) access issues, 2) issues related to use of the Internet, and 3) issues to do with coordination of Internet resources.

Access

The most basic issues relate to access: what access can you get, how much does it cost? This will be the result of market transactions between whoever owns the pipes. Unlike the phone system, which was mostly set up by governments, there was no provision in data carriage for charging models that would encourage extension of the network in less financially rewarding areas. Of course, another thing to remember is that the US has been very active for decades in trying to overturn the settlement regime where countries receive money for connecting calls from elsewhere.

Here’s a map that outlines some main routes on the North American Internet. You can see that there’s no one network, but a few big private players and a number of very small ones. So the network is not ungoverned - the decisions of those large players have large impacts, and all their development is situated within a legal regime that determines what is possible to build, how competition works, what kinds of contracts are enforceable, etc. However, if the major players make a decision that is not in the public interest, there’s no one place you can go to sort out the system.

This is one area where we see a clear gap between how things should operate in an ideal world and how they actually operate. The theory is that the Internet, as a network of networks sharing a common protocol, almost self-organises to find the most efficient way of sending information from one computer to another. The cost involved should be in connecting to the network. Then, if you run one of the large routing points that’s connected to a lot of others, you get some traffic coming to your network, you get some traffic leaving your network, and it all sorts itself out – swings and roundabouts. In practice, large networks have the power to set the pricing agenda for connectivity, and increasingly they refuse to carry the traffic of other networks as a matter of course. This can mean, for example, that traffic between networks in New Zealand might be routed via the United States because there isn’t a peering agreement between the two networks. The bottom line is that the large networks call the shots. “Net Neutrality” is probably worth a paper on its own, but it’s enough to say that although there has been an ideology about the internet as “neutral”, it never has been (although the protocols might be). The internet exists mostly in the private sector, and the private sector’s job is primarily to accumulate capital by excluding others from its property to create a desirable product/service. There are strong economic incentives for pipe-owners to find the best ways of monetising their investment, which may or may not include open-ness.

Internet Use

Then, there are the issues related to Internet use: spam, cybercrime, intellectual property, etc. These are extremely complex but obviously critical. It is in these areas where the gaps in Internet Governance become evident. For better and worse there is no way of systematically coordinating the entire system to address these issues. These issues are transforming the Internet and being transformed by the Internet, but they are not limited to it. So you can’t necessarily invent Internet-only processes for dealing with issues like cybercrime - they have to be harmonised with existing bodies that have responsibility for them. It’s here also, that the limitations of the private/consensus model of Internet governance are evident. Take for example, the history of Intellectual Property discussions with respect to domain names, which in the Internet arena go something like this:

  1. These issues are not important in the Internet (remember Barlow and Cerf’s comments)
  2. OK, they might be important, we’ll get a few basic processes in place to deal with the issues of the largest players, but essentially we’re not touching it because it’s not really important.
  3. Hmm, it appears that there are massive financial and legal implications to these decisions. We’ll work with organisations like WIPO to implement a new dispute procedure, which happens to be a bit friendlier to US business interests than earlier IP coordination mechanisms.

Coordination of Resources

Finally there is the area of resource coordination. This is what most people think about when it comes to Internet Governance, and it is a byzantine, acronym filled world of domain names, IP addresses, root servers, and protocols. I think the ironic thing about the false “UN vs. ICANN” opposition is how much both sides love acronyms and have processes that are almost impenetrable for the average user. Most of the governance discussion is about this area because it is where there are identifiable power bases that can be analysed. Although the computers on the network are decentralised, there are some areas of central coordination around domain names, IP addresses, protocols, and servers.

ICANN: IP addresses and DNS resources

As you probably know, the Internet is not a centralised network, but a network of networks that communicates using TCP/IP, the protocols set by Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn back in the 70s. The rapid growth of the Internet caused issues in keeping track of which computers were on it. A group including Jon Postel and others created the domain name system (DNS) to make Internet navigation easier. With DNS, users can type host names instead of numbers like “106.27.3.72.” In 1984 RFC 920 established 7 generic “top level domains” (gTLDs, including .com, .net, .org and .gov) to provide domain space for corporations, non-profits, schools, networks, US government offices and the US military. This would be a decision with profound and unforseen commercial implications. As Wolfgang Kleinwatcher has observed, the creation of a new domain is creating a new domain is like the creation of “new territory in cyberspace” and has unavoidable economic, political, and cultural implications. At the time of these developments certain assumptions would be made about “the user” which would have long-running consequences as the governance issues developed.

The principle of delegation says that whoever has responsibility for a particular domain has delegated authority to control all beneath it. The creation of just seven domains places an inordinate amount of power in whoever controls .com. As the Internet grew rapidly, this would become a license to print money. The controls on what gTLDs can exist has become one of the major sticking points in Internet Governance, and the call for the creation of new domains through a transparent process remains one of the loudest complaints levelled at ICANN.

It is worth remembering that ICANN do not control the protocols of Internet transmission - but simply the allocation of IP addresses and the domain name system. These can be seen as equivalent to control of the phone numbers and the phone book, rather than the phone system. There aren’t too many issues related to TCP-IP, or the protocols that underpin the Internet. And even IP addressing, while more controversial, appears relatively stable under the RIRs such as APNIC based here in Brisbane. But when it comes to limited resources, there is money to be made, and where there is money to be made, there is political struggle.

People in the technical community have a habit of downplaying the political issues at stake here. In a famous comment, Esther Dyson, former chair of ICANN and noted Internet personality, could say in 1998:

ICANN does not “aspire to address” any Internet governance issues; in effect, it governs the plumbing, not the people. It has a very limited mandate to administer certain (largely technical) aspects of the Internet infrastructure in general and the Domain Name System in particular.

However, as we have seen, the relationship between the plumbing and the people is the very reason the domain name system exists. And shortly after Dyson’s comments, Verisign would buy Network Solutions in 2000 for $US 21billion on the basis of a business that would be instantly rendered much less valuable if the restriction on new gTLDs was lifted. Whenever there are large amounts of money around, there is governance. Especially when one government is a particular player.

Role of the US Government

The period since 1987 sees the devolution of the DNS to control by the US-dominated private sector, with the US Government maintaining a long leash that it could pull whenever control threatened to relocate to international forums. The most notable example comes in the period of crisis around the performance of Network Solutions, the company with an effective monopoly on registrations in the .com domain space. An unlikely coalition of Internet old-timers in The Internet Society and IANA, who were unhappy with the monopoly capitalism brought about through privatisation, paired with representatives from international organisations such as the ITU and WIPO to form the Internet International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) in 96-97. They proposed policy and procedure changes for administering gTLDs - a gTLD-MoU as the proposal became known - in particular seeking to strengthen the role of self-identified stakeholders who felt shut out of the existing processes which seemed designed to bolster the registry coffers more than anything else. The IAHC included trademark people and Internet people (a remarkable turnaround from the gap David Maher mentioned between these groups just a few years earlier), as well as privacy advocates, standards bodies and Internet and telecommunications carriers.

The opponents of this plan, particularly US-based business interests, made themselves active in the many US govt Committee hearings on the subject at the time. Ross Rader notes “perhaps most damaging to the gTLD-MoU was the comments of Sernovitz from the Association for Interactive Media (AIM), who denounced the IAHC and IANA as ‘betraying the United States to the governments of Libya and Iraq.’ While the claims were never completely substantiated or formally investigated, they damaged the credibility of the group behind the gTLD-MoU [in the eyes of the US Government]. Further, the total of all the comments successfully managed to call into focus the potential shift of power that the Internet represented to a country other than the United States.”
In November 1998 the US Department of Commerce signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ICANN, a non-profit based in California, delegating it the authority for the apportioning of critical Internet resources - domain names and IP addresses. This MoU still exists - effective control over ICANN is held by the US Department of Commerce. Given USG’s history of resistance to internationalisation, you can understand why numerous governmental and non-governmental actors from outside the US might find it troubling that their use of the Internet is dependent on an entity functioning under a US govt agency. Particularly when that agency was birthed under political pressures that scuttled broad, multistakeholder management practices with unsubstantiated fear mongering about foreign governments.

Domains and their control

The most controversial issues in Internet Governance lie in areas under ICANN’s control. These are
1) Control of country-code Top Level Domains (ccTLDs)
2) The process for creation and approval of generic top-level domains;
3) The development of Internationalised domain names (IDNs).
These are the three issues that I think are most likely to give ICANN significant trouble as they move forward.

Country Code Top Level Domains

Initially, the process of keeping track of domain names and who owned them is a task that Jon Postel did by himself, reportedly in a paper notebook, and it’s now under the control of ICANN. Here is where you get some real action in the governance stakes. Postel originally decided that anyone who was “trustworthy” could administer a country code domain, whether or not they were associated with that country’s government (in fact, in geek culture, being from government might count against you being thought of as trustworthy).

When the Internet changed from a marginal research network to critical economic infrastructure during the 90s, governments understandably thought that they should have some role to play in the management of their country’s identity, because they were responsible for the maintenance of their country’s infrastructure in every other field. In some cases these could be worked out, such as in Australia.

But, for example, countries like Niue have never had control of their domain, and the story is instructive. In 1997, a former US Peace Corp working for the Niuean government set up a business arrangement with an American business man and approached the Niue government to control < .nu> under the name of the Internet Users Society of Niue (IUSN). The IUSN (a non-profitable company), then re-delegated the management and marketing responsibilities to the US-based company, NU Domain Ltd. This is the company that realized the revenue earning capacity of < .nu>, especially by marketing it to Scandinavian countries, where it carries connotations of words such as “brand new”. This struggle is ongoing and is but one unforseen example of a faith in decentralised private contracts not quite delivering the public policy benefits intended.

Top Level Domains

The rationale for limitation on generic top-level domains is that it is unclear how many new domains the Domain Name System could handle. Unfortunately, the level of technical opinion varies greatly on this issue. One thing that is known is that John Postel declared that another fifty could be added without causing significant additional stress. Why haven’t they been? “Stability and security” is the stated reason, but one must also wonder at how much pressure is asserted by incumbents who do well out of the situation where the number of domains is limited. The process for approval of new gTLDs - a very poorly documented one by most accounts - is now being extended to ensure that proposed new top level domains are accompanied by a business plan to show financial sustainability for whoever successfully bids for them. Unfortunately, as ICANN committee member Bret Fausett noted, ICANN can’t agree on criteria to assess the business plans. Most of the ones they’ve approved so far (.aero, .travel, .museum) have not been huge successes. Further, one they are looking to approve which would be widely taken up (.xxx) has foundered on political issues.

IDNs

The impenetrable mechanisms for the approval of new TLDs like .travel becomes even more bizarre if you think that there are an estimated 60 million out of the 100million internet users in China who browse the web *only* in Chinese, but it is so far not possible to have the Chinese language equivalent of .com. This lack of progress on internationalised domain names, or IDNs, is perhaps the largest challenge to the established governance order. Now as you’ll remember, the domain name system is not to make computers work, but is to make it easier for humans to access the various computers. Unfortunately, at the time the domain name system was invented, no one ever thought you might have humans working in languages other than English. That’s not surprising for an overwhelmingly US-based research network. The bigger question is about what’s happened over the last decade as hundreds of millions of people who don’t speak English have come online. The answer, unfortunately, is not much.

Initially, it was no real problem to use a roman script for domain names and expect others to do the same. As the Internet expanded, it was recognised that it would be good to use other character scripts in domain names, but the DNS only works with roman script, and it was decided that upgrading it would be too disruptive. Frightened by the appearance of keyword systems that did DNS-like services in Korea and elsewhere, there was a move to find a solution that was backwards compatible with the existing system. The IDN system developed under the auspices of the IETF translates non-roman scripts into roman script and back again. As it turns out, there are all kinds of intellectual property and usability issues (for example - if you register mcdonalds.com in English do you have to do it in every script?) and influential technologists such as John Klensin are beginning to wonder whether the DNS isn’t the best way of dealing with all this. Which would be fine - except that the DNS is all we have at the moment and the decisions that are made about it are still dominated by the interests of those in English-speaking countries. And those established interests are not really that keen on proposing alternative systems to the DNS, which currently makes them a lot of money. It was not until the end of 2005 that ICANN committed itself to serious work on the issue, and there is a long, long way to go.

Let’s turn this around and ask it in a different way. What if the network had originated in Japan, and for the first years of its existence you could only use Japanese? Then, as the network expands, you have a system that translates some English words into Japanese but forces you to use strange Japanese English idioms while it appears that the Japanese can do whatever they want - particularly when DNS became a branding platform in 2000. The system would seem to assist companies who had Japanese brands (who, funnily enough, mostly happened to be in Japan). When you complain they tell you that there are all these mailing lists, where business is aggressively conducted in various Japanese dialects, where you are welcome to make your thoughts known. I think the response among the US and friends would be to get moving on an alternate system as fast as possible. Particularly if the chair of the standards-setting body said “There is no getting away from the unique root of the public DNS.” (i.e., don’t think about setting up a different system that would work for you).

The threat of alternate roots

This is the largest implication of the current contests over Internet Governance - the threat of alternate roots and domain name systems. At the moment, purely by agreement, almost everyone uses the same phone book that is distributed around the world’s root servers. If some significant figures - say, hypothetically, large ISPs in China - became fed up with the ICANN phone book and wanted to use a different one that allowed Chinese characters, there would be nothing stopping them from doing so. They would probably copy the existing list of domain names and their associated addresses, and then add some extra lines to it for Chinese domains they’ve registered without waiting for ICANN/IANA approval. If you did a lot of business in China, this new “unofficial” phone book would be a lot more useful than the official one, even if it was only 99% accurate.

Some problems could emerge in this scenario. To give one example - what happens if there are conflicting IP addresses for a single name between the new system and the existing system? This could easily happen when a new venture sets up in China and builds an identity around a particular domain name that it has purchased locally - but then finds that a company in Singapore is using the same name for its website. For the user, you would not be able to tell in advance which site you were going to when you type in the domain name, because it will depend on which DNS system your ISP is using, which is not always transparent.

It’s for these reasons that those involved in Internet Governance (and ICANN in particular) seek to maintain a single and unique root zone file.

Personally, I believe the threat of alternate roots is overrated. There are Internet messaging systems like Skype and AIM that don’t rely at all on the domain name system, and finding other ways of handling the problem is possible. And let’s remember, that international business continues to take place even though not everyone speaks the same language. It’s definitely a good thing to feel like you can access any computer, anywhere. But if the cost of that globalness is being bound to a system that may not be in your interests, as it is for a lot of people, then it suddenly becomes less appealing.

It’s a delicate political game going on. No one wants to split the root. But if it came down to a game of chicken, where you were forced to choose between a domain name system which was “official”, or one which was pretty close to the official one but had an extra 30 000 Chinese-language websites in it, which one would you choose? This is the impetus for Internet Governance reform - the alternative is that economics may end up driving the decision and it won’t be in favour of the existing players.

Governance methods

I want to finish by evaluating how these tensions are occurring and how they relate to other governance issues more generally.

Principles and mechanisms

In their excellent book Global Business Regulation, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos suggest that the key factors that impact upon regulatory regimes can be separated into actors, principles, and mechanisms. Principles set the high-level agenda for governance, while mechanisms are the low-level processes by which things work. So for example, both Australia and New Zealand are described as governed on the democratic principle. But the mechanisms by which the principle is made real - for example, Australia’s preferential voting system versus NZ’s proportional representation system - mean that the activity of people participating in that democracy can be quite different. Under proportional representation a minor party is a much more viable parliamentary option, and so strategies of political parties and voters are different under these different mechanisms.

Contests happen over both principles and mechanisms. In small groups, it is easy to resolve conflict directly, so complex mechanisms aren’t needed, and much of the dialogue is about principles that bring the group together. When a small group of engineers decided to set up a way of linking computer networks together to form the Internet, they spent a lot of time thinking about the principles of openness, decentralisation, and independence that would go into the network. While some mechanisms for how these would be developed weren’t so sophisticated, it didn’t really matter that much because, as Maher’s story showed us, if you were committed you could get involved with the policy mechanisms even if people tried to dissuade you.

The problems with existing Internet Governance processes largely stem from thinking that their principles are sufficient for effective governance. They might have been at one stage. But now, everyone from your Latin American activist-Linux developer to Microsoft is in favour of “empowering the user” and “openness”. When the French and the US argue over “freedom”, who’s right? The way these principles are operationalised is a political contest among people with very different stakes and capacities. And one’s orientation toward a particular body or group depends a lot on your history with them.

Consensus and openness

Speaking of the French, they have a great saying: “Those who don’t do politics, get done in by politics”.

Internet governance organisations, as befits their engineering heritage, seek to avoid the concept of the political at any opportunity. Internet Governance began with volunteers and research organizations that created authority through consensus. According to John Palfrey, as we have seen, many of those active in ICANN today, particularly in the more technical capacities, come from the IETF tradition of “rough consensus” sought by “listening to the hums” in the room. Generally, consensus works in relatively homogenous environments where there is a shared understanding of what success will look like. That applies to a group of software engineers discussing technical protocols, but it definitely does not apply to the global base of Internet users and the Internet industry. Because consensus as a mechanism is weak, dissenting voices have never fared as well on mailing lists as established interests. However, any questioning of this mechanism results in a fierce defence of “openness, democracy, and consensus.”
For example, M. Stuart Lynn, upon appointment as president and chief executive, said, “ICANN takes its lead not from me but from the Internet community as a whole.” The 100 million Internet users in China who currently have little direct input into Internet Governance processes might treat this argument with some scepticism.

Part of the rationale for governance regimes in the commercial sector is that there are people and groups outside your management team who are critical to your organisation’s development. Effective governance processes ensure that an organisation’s strategic direction is responsive to those people and groups. In the case of Enron, we saw the dangers of groupthink, of believing that the people around the table at any particular time will make the best possible decision. This is the logic of consensus, which is predicated on the existence of a shared culture.
However, in more complex environments, the issues are somewhat different. Business school advice for CEOs now focuses less on building a shared culture, and more on remaining open to different and challenging views. Because you might be out of touch with your sources of future growth without you even knowing it. Then the game changes and you find that someone else is where you once were. IBM failing to keep up with the PC boom in the 1980s is a commonly quoted example.

The key issue with the Internet Governance regimes, which I think reflects a broader divide between approaches to governance, is their orientation toward diversity and conflict. The current mode of ICANN is one of defensiveness. If there is criticism of a process, it will immediately be met by a flurry of defences of its working principles and openness and innovation. After a century of psychoanalysis we know that defensiveness is essentially an expression of fear and resistance to change. There’s no upside to it - while it temporarily makes you feel better, your critics will smell the fear and come after you even harder. The only way to remove tension is to turn toward it and have a dialogue with it, allow it to change you.

To create forums where not only diverse, but also sometimes opposed perspectives can be brought into productive conversation is the great challenge of governance. In this respect, I would encourage people to make a close examination of the intergovernmental system and to realise that its agencies have been remarkably successful at this in various times. Of course, such a system is not likely to always be “efficient”, or “flexible”, or “innovative and dynamic” - particularly when compared to a smaller, less diverse private sector organisation. But then, as the recent history of privatisation in public utilities has shown us, focusing on principles of efficient flexibility might come with its own downsides in the areas of universal service provision, accountability to smaller stakeholders, and even “stability and security”. Personally, I’m less keen for my electricity company to be “flexible and innovative” and more keen for it to ensure I’ll receive power.

As a geek and a theorist, I love principles. But as a businessperson and consultant, I am usually drawn back to reality, and have the role of reminding organisations what is or isn’t within their capabilities in real life. I am especially sensitive to when people contrast real life to principles and vice versa. It seems to me that when the established players in Internet Governance are criticised for their real-life lack of diversity and responsiveness, they respond with principles. When confronted with issues that have been dealt with for many years other bodies, such as intellectual property or international cooperation, they assert that the Internet is different and that it needs to be dealt with according to their principles.
But the principles aren’t what matters - what matters is that in the relentless focus on the novelty of Internet governance, we risk disrespecting the work that has been done in the past on all sorts of relevant global issues such as shipping, environmental change. If we ignore the people who have undertaken that work, we will fail to use their experience to develop our capacity to deal with complex governance situations.

It is possible to believe, if you spend a lot of time in Internet culture, that governments are bad, that geography doesn’t matter, that any space for “individual participation” is the best measure of openness. For the anthropologist in the house of Internet Governance, the first thing you notice is that the history of Internet development has actually been all about one government, that the power bases are not at all global but concentrated in Europe and the US, and that most of the individuals on the Internet have no way in hell of participating in any of the decisions about how it’s run. It’s quite a disconnect.

That’s a problem of legitimacy, although as we know legitimacy isn’t a prerequisite for holding power. I think the bigger problem is that the dominant ideology of Internet Governance is drawn from a very simplistic view of people and culture that is visibly based in the culture of English-speaking settler nations, and these no longer make up the majority of Internet users. Personally, I would love to see truly global, truly user-driven mechanisms for the management of the Internet. But I think that to get there we need to develop sophisticated and relatively neutral mechanisms for mediating differences, and, much as we did in the post-dotcom era, to remember that some of the things people have learnt over the years in the offline world might be useful to us.

Digital Rights Management and Music in Australasia

Digital Rights Management and Music in Australasia

Danny Butt and Axel Bruns

Preprint of article published in Media and Arts Law Review, 10(4), November 2005

The Contemporary DRM Terrain

Technologists tend to see Digital Rights Management (DRM) as a technological solution, lawyers worry about its relation to copyright law, economists concern themselves with the market issues, and labels - and some musicians - see it as a way to maintain their right to extract revenue from the use of their intellectual property. And for the listeners, who are after all the source of market demand, DRM provides mainly headaches but few tangible benefits. While much of the Digital Rights Management debate concentrates on legal, economic, or technical issues, we focus on the implications of such issues for the user experience, which we believe will be a primary determinant of the success of DRM systems2. We finish with a set of questions and recommendations that are particularly focussed on the Australian environment and its musical production.

DRM emerges from a specific set of problems within the content industries in the wake of technological changes that have radically transformed the range of available content, and the methods for obtaining it. These changes include the shift from analogue to digital technologies in the production, distribution and storage of musical and other content, and the associated increase in the flexibility of content formats which can now be reconfigured, remixed, and redistributed quickly and easily using standard consumer devices. As the INDICARE report on consumer acceptance of DRM noted:

So what have consumers got in the past thirty years, during the evolution from VCRs to portable MP3 players? They have got used to obtaining content conveniently - they do not even have to stand up from their chairs any more - and having other (in many cases cheaper) ways to obtain content than buying it in shops.3

However, for reasons which at least appear commonsensical, content providers do not want their products to be transferable anywhere and reproduced free of charge. They are unhappy with the inability of the law to deny access and discourage copying, even though the history of failed legislative attempts to limit consumer choice and convenience - from the fixed-frequency radio sets of the 1920s to the debate over cassette tapes in the 1960s and 70s or present-day region-encoding schemes for DVDs - already points to the ultimate futility of such efforts. Therefore, content industries are working with technology developers to deploy a range of measures to provide ‘digital enforcement’ of rights protection. As Lawrence Lessig has demonstrated, ‘code is law’, and software is an instrument that constrains and enables behaviour, outside of the legal system we traditionally rely on4. This observation can be further extended to also include some of the hardware measures used to enforce DRM regimes.

A form of ‘vigilante justice’ by IP holders, DRM-related Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) can be seen as an attempt to bypass any legislative “copyright bargains” which have traditionally been struck between the incentives for commercial producers and the public benefits from non-commercial circulation. The network of devices existing under any specific DRM regime becomes a separate jurisdiction in its own right, and raises fundamental questions about the ability of nations such as Australia to legislate in support of the development of their culture and content industries. When Windows computers automatically download ‘Windows Media Player 10′ updates from Microsoft, altering their embedded DRM structures, neither Microsoft nor the users are waiting to consider whether these changes provide any ‘national benefit’ to Australia, or whether indeed they are compatible with the various types of copyright exceptions specified in Australian law. For the end user, the ‘copy’ menu item will simply be greyed out, with little or no ability to appeal this change in order to uphold traditional ‘fair dealing’ or other legislated rights.

Thus, national policy in this field will continue to play ‘catch up’ with processes that are largely outside the control of individual nation-states. The technological DRM systems predominantly in use today overwhelmingly emerge from the United States, and following the signing of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement we can expect greater harmonisation of Australia’s intellectual property regime with that of the U.S. - although as Young and Collins5 have pointed out, this harmonisation will be selective. Australia has a markedly different economic position in the global music industry from that of the United States, and may have economic interests that are often opposed to the aims of the major U.S. music and technology corporations. Kim Weatherall has noted that through this bilateral trade agreement Australia has committed itself to a detailed 29-page IP framework which has had no formal assessment by relevant government bodies such as the Productivity Commission, and reviews of the FTA either ignored the IP chapter or even suggested negative implications for Australia’s economy.6

Senior Staff Attorney Fred von Lohmann from the Electronic Frontier Foundation uses Jessica Litman’s formulation on how debates over copyright legislation appear from the end user perspective. Overall, it is fair to assume that the public has little incentive to reduce infringement for its own sake. However, ‘taken to the extreme, rampant infringement will result in the collapse of the music, movie and publishing industries, say copyright owners.’ As a lawyer responding to such claims on behalf of the public, ‘you would likely treat this argument with some skepticism. While unlawful copying is (and always has been) a problem, no one is proposing that copyright law be eliminated. Accordingly, copyright-based incentives for continued production of creative works will remain.’7 From the public’s perspective, then, the question associated with Digital Rights Management is not how DRM technologies can be used to stamp out unsanctioned content use completely, but how they can be deployed to ensure such incentives for content producers without infringing on the rights of end users, or criminalising them altogether.

However, for legislative and technological reasons, it appears increasingly likely that decisions in US entertainment and intellectual property law, which may have previously acted as a marker or guide for local scholars, will increasingly become an integral part of the Australasian legislative framework as well. The DRM systems that are possible or imaginable in the local environment are unlikely to be unique; they will largely be instances of global platforms and protocols. Rather than inventing an ideal DRM system, the challenge will be to forge a shared understanding of local priorities in this global field that is heavily shaped by non-local legal, economic, and technological concerns. Consequently, we summarise both local and non-local issues from the DRM literature and a series of interviews, with the purpose of assessing where the significant ‘points of leverage’ that shape the system might be found.

This paper draws upon 20 semi-structured interviews with musicians, performers, intellectual property experts, broadcasters, economic development agencies, collecting societies, industry bodies, commentators, and academic experts in Australia and New Zealand. The interviews were conducted in-person by Danny Butt between October 2004 and February 2005, with locations provided in the notes. Interviewees were asked for comments on wide-ranging topics including: copying, sampling, and re-use of music; clearances and collection agencies; trends in intellectual property law; alternative rights management systems; DRM systems, and the future of digital music. The aim was not to test particular hypotheses about DRM, or gain a representative consensus on key topics; but rather to gain illustrative perspectives on these issues from a variety of points of view.

The Stakeholders in DRM

Protection against duplication has been the overwhelming driver of DRM adoption, even though DRM can be used for other purposes, such as specifying use rights and tracking royalties. Content providers have posited that strong DRM measures will result in a benefit for consumers as more content is being made available again. This claim is usually justified through a prediction of increased participation in the digital content arena by content providers if they feel more secure. The validity of this claim has yet to be tested, however - indeed, there is a great dearth of independent evidence that increased copyright infringement through filesharing and other exchange systems has had any direct negative impact on the development of new content at all.

However, there appears little if any direct consumer benefit built into DRM systems. In an Australian industry panel on DRM in 2004, Kim Anderson of Southern Star Entertainment suggested that ‘there is almost a complete contradiction between what users and rights-holders want in terms of portability and flexibility.’8[AB1] Currently, consumer electronics manufacturers and computer software developers are doing their utmost to develop users’ expectations of the digital network as an environment to share and transform content - witness, for example, Apple’s ‘Rip. Mix. Burn.’ campaign; in addition, there is also a strong tradition (from filesharing platforms such as the original Napster through to other content and information exchange systems including podcasting, Audioscrobbler, or the Internet CD and movie databases) of users themselves developing the tools to enhance their experience of digital content. Amidst a surfeit of content, users look for new ways to manage and experience that content through a combination of such tools and new hardware devices such as iPods and personal video recorders. As Foxtel CEO Kim Williams put it on the same panel, these devices reduce consumption versus ‘lifestyle conflicts’9.

Compared to the device manufacturers, however, content providers remain in a largely defensive and reactive position, concentrating on legal avenues to limit the power of these new tools and devices rather than on the development of new business models. Their stance is also further complicated since a number of device manufacturers coexist with content providers under the same corporate umbrella - so, for example, Sony Electronics’ line of MP3 players, DVD burners, and personal video recorders can be seen as a direct threat to Sony Music’s revenue streams, while sales of AOL broadband access are driven in good part by the very filesharing practices which Warner Music would prefer to stamp out.10

Thus, the question which we believe will drive the development and acceptance of DRM systems is: “Who can remain close to the customer?” For example, who does the listener turn to when finding music? Historically, this has shifted from the live performer to the venue owner, the radio station, and the music video programme. Currently, demand in digital music is overwhelmingly driven by the computer and device manufacturers, who must balance the needs of labels and the desires of consumers, and consumer initiatives (such as filesharing) themselves, which focus almost entirely on the needs of the end user. As the labels express their desire to regain control of the listener relationship in the online environment, a range of different business models and technical platforms with different and incompatible DRM systems will continue to emerge. However, the success of Apple’s iTunes Music Store shows that users have a clear preference for unobtrusive DRM systems, convenient access, and “ownership” (rather than rental or subscription) of their music purchases.

The challenge for major content companies will be to move back into a position of supplying what the customer wants (and building a sustainable business model around this transaction) instead of preventing customers from getting what they want. In the meantime, however, they will jostle for legislative support (increased penalties for piracy, mandated DRM, outlawing the bypassing of technological protection measures, etc.) to shore up existing business models. Electronics and computer companies try to maintain customer demand through innovative products, on the other hand, while attempting not to alienate too many of the content companies who may refuse to license their material for platforms that do not support complete content company control over the digital content experience. User advocates will attempt to maintain the traditional exemptions associated with copyright in a digital environment even though DRM can be used to undermine them. Users themselves will continue to pursue usage they now see as ‘customary’ in the digital environment: the ability to shift formats of recordings through time and space, in the process making copies for personal use. The interplay between these groups will shape the future success of DRM and alternative licensing schemes, and we suggest that in light of the continuing failure of ‘hard DRM’ approaches to win consumer approval and change end user practices there will - and must - be a move toward more consumer-oriented DRM design and business models.

TWO WORLDS

Drawing from our interviews, we have developed a clear picture of two relatively discrete “music ecologies” at work in digital music, each with their own legal, economic and cultural dynamics. This analysis perhaps reflects other literature in sociology and economics that describes a bimodal nature of informational economies11.

The first is the “industry”, dominated by the five major record companies; their vertical integration with other major media, retail, and hardware / software companies; as well as their articulations into various policy-making bodies. The tightly-integrated ‘distribution-driven ecology’ of the major industry sector is overwhelmingly driving the adoption of Digital Rights Management. Wallis et al. point to a wide range of literature identifying an increasing concentration of ownership in the global industry, and concomitant formal and informal integration within and between different sectors12. Together, Polygram (Netherlands), Sony (Japan), Warner (US), EMI (UK) and BMG (Germany) account consistently for 70-80 percent of global music sales. The mainstream industry is also characterised by a marked disconnect between content providers and audiences - major labels (and even some major acts under contract to them) are seen predominantly as commercial operations which engage in exploitative business practices and command little listener loyalty, if not even engendering outright resistance.

The second ecology is constituted by a much more disorganised set of relationships among mostly (but not exclusively) independent producers, distributors, markets, and audiences. While its share of the market is smaller, it constitutes a much higher number of musicians (employment) and musical products (i.e. intellectual property). The primary drivers in this ecology are production and niche market demand, and while the taste cultures supported by this ecology frequently span the globe, the companies involved often have a much stronger local basis than the majors.13 For smaller economy policy-makers, this ecology therefore also offers the most sustainable national benefit. As Murray Jeffrey from New Zealand’s economic development agency NZ Trade and Enterprise points out:

We’ve got something like 80 or 90 independent record companies in New Zealand. MP3 is a huge opportunity for them. Getting on the radio in the US is not going to happen without a huge investment. It [the digital distribution channel] might be a niche market but in a large export market a niche is more than our national sales.14

This tier of the industry is able to build on a much stronger sense of customer loyalty - to individual artists, but frequently also to labels themselves where they are seen as strong supporters of specific taste cultures.

Industry development and DRM

The development of the ‘music industry’ is not a straightforward proposition. A recent briefing on the needs of the Australian music industry concluded that the majority of the challenges facing the industry could be traced to a lack of integration and cooperation, particularly in terms of communication to key stakeholders (government and community)15. What is rarely explored is that the economic interests of various parts of the industry are not only different, but ultimately opposed. For the local arms of the multinationals, the highest revenue comes from sales which have minimum investment in product development and rely on their cross-media marketing and distribution networks: e.g. overseas ‘hit content.’ For local musicians, a healthy independent scene, particularly at the publishing level, may be the surest path to sustainable development. The same may also be true for regional economic development strategies. These generally have employment and IP generation as their goal, and thus have an incentive to support the producer-driven ecology. As Kate Oakley points out:

Brand development, marketing and the boosting of sales of a local artist, even by a big label, is of no major economic benefit to Queensland’s economy if the State loses the rights on income through intellectual property (IP) on the artist or his or her production.16

One might note that the intellectual property rights of local musicians are important, and DRM can surely benefit them. [AB2]Anti-DRM campaigners are sometimes aligned with anti-copyright movements, but important distinctions must be made. The critique of DRM is not a critique of artists’ rights to make a living from their work. Few anti-DRM campaigners claim that copyright laws should be overturned. Instead, it is noted that existing DRM systems are focussed on the distinctive needs of a few very large companies and exceed the provisions of the law, but that it is very difficult for independent artists, businesses and users to shape DRM systems to their own needs. As Chris Atkins suggests, usage tracking is a potential boon to the independent artist, but the overwhelming emphasis of DRM systems is on protection against casual copying, rather than these more positive DRM features. It is also worth noting that regardless of the success or otherwise of DRM measures in policing copyright, ‘in an industry founded on exploitation, oiled by deceit, riven with theft and fuelled by greed’ (as veteran musician and record label operator Robert Fripp has famously put it17) most musicians continue to receive only a minute share of the revenue from sales of their music, *after* label expenses have been recouped. Where this is the case, most musicians are likely to have only limited interest in supporting standard DRM systems.

Thus, content protection technologies in DRM are *designed for dominant players in the market*. When applied to less popular content, they form a barrier to its discovery, use, and popularity.[AB3] It is interesting to observe in this context that even Microsoft will not pursue technical forms of IP protection in markets where it is not in a dominant position. Scheiner notes that Microsoft’s Steve Ballmer has been quoted as wanting to enable Windows to be pirated in China in the short term, as a way of gaining mind share. He suggests that new entrants in a market always benefit from having their content pirated in the short term18. This is hardly a new approach for Microsoft - its MS-DOS operating system was one of the most pirated software products of the 1970s and 80s, contributing significantly to the current market position for the successor platform Windows - but it does undermine the music industry’s claims that copying (whether in the form of taping, ripping, or filesharing) inevitably ‘kills music’.

This is because, unlike many other commodities, music is highly diverse and not always substitutable: it is the circulation of music which creates the demand for a particular piece of music. For example, I may feel like going out to buy a new CD. Choosing between hip hop artists Eminem and 50 Cent, my preference for one or the other may not be great, and so the price of these CDs may be an influence in my decision. However, this situation differs from the music listener who hears Shania Twain on the radio then decides to buy the CD. They are not going to buy an Eminem CD (or a Britney Spears CD) even if it is a quarter of the cost. This is how circulation of music generates demand. (In the U.S. this is recognised for example in the fact that terrestrial radio stations are not required to pay sound recording royalties to music publishers for broadcasting their songs - instead their doing so is considered to provide a beneficial free service to the music industry.19) As Petrick notes, ‘the introduction of a work that is diverse enough in relation to the other works may create new value by creating previously non-existent (or below price level) demand.’20 The challenge for independents is almost always creating demand, and given the market demand for artists with a track record, it makes sense that the challenge in the short term is building a critical mass of audience support.

However, the economic implications of prematurely controlling copying through heavy-handed Digital Rights Management regimes are not limited to the end listener’s experience and limiting consumer demand. In environments where digital production, sampling and remixing are the norm, DRM can equal a direct loss of licensing revenue opportunities, as effective sampling can rarely be predicted prior to use. As Melbourne electronic musician Andrew Garton notes, ‘If I think about using something as a sample, I copy it, see if it works, and then think about rights issues later. If I can’t copy it, I’ll use something else.’21 The irony is that even artists whose work is based on sampled material may have its re-use compromised by DRM. This was the case for hip-hop group the Beastie Boys, who eventually had to apologise to their fans for the copy-protection applied by label EMI to their CD22.

Beyond such well-known celebrity cases in the commercial arena, wider cultural and economic issues are at play. Sampling, remixing, and other forms of creative content reuse and reappropriation (or even de-propriation, as one group has called the practice23) have now become part and parcel of the growing trend towards grassroots and vernacular creative practices which have emerged especially in reaction to the rise of digital media production and distribution technologies. Commentators such as Leadbeater24 and Howkins25 point to the fact that Western economies are swiftly developing into creative economies which are based in good part on DIY cultural practices and the growing cultural participation of previously passive audiences as active ‘pro-am’ content producers26. The creative community acts as both user and producer of content, and increasingly combines both practices in the act of what can be termed ‘produsing’27 - the collaborative creation of new content based on existing material from other sources. Such content has significant potential both from a cultural point of view, as it enables a wide swathe of society to be active cultural participants rather than merely passive recipients of content, and from a narrower economic perspective as this increased cultural production is also likely to spawn new commercially viable content, content genres, and content producers.

However, current intellectual property provisions, already significantly extending traditional copyright terms beyond the life of the author and now reinforced through hard DRM measures, significantly stifle this trend towards more ‘pandemic’ DIY creative practices. They make it difficult for grassroots creatives to draw on existing content, as they do not have the legal resources necessary to negotiate clearances. As a partial response to this crisis, recent years have seen the successful introduction of the Creative Commons project28 - not as a way of eradicating intellectual property (as is sometimes claimed by its detractors), but as a means of specifying copyright-style usage limitations which are more conducive to widespread creative practice while maintaining the moral and (where required) economic rights of authors. The Creative Commons system, which is based on a set of clearly formulated content licences, reintroduces certainty about user (including re-user, i.e. remixer) rights and limitations for each piece of content to which its licences are applied, and thereby significantly reduces transaction costs for content use while increasing the potential for creative reuse and collaboration.

Currently, creative commons licences are attached to content mainly in the form of visible or invisible metadata (for example as part of Website metadata structures or through the embedding of CC licence logos and links in pages or text files which accompany licenced content). There is nothing which would prevent the application of DRM frameworks and technologies to CC-licenced content, however - deployed in this fashion, DRM tools could therefore be used to specifically permit and even encourage further uses of licenced content rather than mainly preventing them.

Copyright Exceptions and Fair Use

In addition to such new approaches, countries with developed intellectual property policy frameworks tend to retain various exceptions or exclusions from the unique license to exploit intellectual property. The exemptions recognise that fundamental conflicts exist between the property rights of the rights holder and the rights of freedom of expression and privacy of the user, as well as dividing the ‘bundle of rights’ between the product owner and IP owner29. A second rationale accounts for the “public good” nature of creative works in an economic sense. In the former British Commonwealth, these consist of various exemptions (’fair dealing’), mostly for the purposes of “research and private study” or “criticism, review and news reporting”. Uses outside of these areas cannot be considered fair dealing, no matter how ‘fair’ they are. The right to engage in fair dealing is considered a right of the user, and the Commonwealth system is focussed on the balance between user and authorial rights.30

In the United States, a less settled doctrine of ‘fair use’ provides for the ‘public good’ nature of creative works more directly - rather than granting rights, fair use is assessed in terms of whether it promotes overall the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’. The beneficial aspects are expressed in economic terms by Paul Petrick: ‘music has potential positive externalities that a copyright holder cannot assess nor recoup when selling it; fair use provides a means to subsidize uses that create sizeable value.’31 Thus many of the most interesting legal cases relating to DRM have taken place under U.S. law, as activities such as peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing are illegal per se in the Commonwealth, regardless of whether they advance the cause of music or not. In fact, digital music players such as Apple’s iPod have almost no legal use in Australasia, even though the devices themselves are not illegal and everyone buys them to engage in illegal activity - listening to CDs they have bought in another format.

Many of the exceptions to both copyright and fair use rights take the specific situation of use and consumption into account. However, this is rarely the case for Digital Rights Management systems, which concentrate on allowable uses predetermined only by the content owner32 - DRM systems development at present remains driven mainly by what is possible from a technological point of view, not by what is required or desirable from a cultural, social, or moral perspective. While there has been some work done on so-called “symmetric” Rights Expression Languages (RELs) that can provide context sensitivity and can enable requests for special exemption, these are faced with many problems, not the least of which is a lack of a key institution to resource handling of these requests. In the analogue world, consumer requests for exemptions are essentially granted *until* a claim against them is made in a court by the content provider. DRM takes precisely the opposite approach, meaning that the courts never get to decide (unless for example cases are brought to determine whether certain DRM regimes undermine basic civil liberties).

DRM AND THE END USER

While industry associations talk up the perils of piracy, the average user’s resistance to DRM is often for more mundane reasons, and these raise a number of significant legal and policy issues.

Music with DRM is a product that might be called ‘usage-impaired’33. From the consumer or user’s point of view, use restrictions may prevent them from private copying or backing up; using content on various devices such as MP3 players (despite there being no legal way to purchase many artists’ music in a digital format that is not bound to a physical carrier medium such as CDs or DVDs); and using it in different locations (some copy-protected CDs will not play on certain makes of car stereo or computers), not to mention an overall reduced ease-of-use for accessing content. Slowinski notes that DRM tends to create time-consuming workarounds for non-infringing uses of content, and this particularly affects not-for-profit organisations such as educational institutions and libraries34.

As DRM systems are further interwoven with so-called ‘trusted computing’ platforms, such problems are likely to be further exacerbated. Trusted computing is the latest in a series of exchanges in a technological arms race between hardware manufacturers (acting in concert with copyright industries) and independent users (seeking to circumvent any usage restrictions introduced through hardware or software measures); it aims to introduce hardware measures which either prevent unsanctioned content uses altogether or at the very least make such use more easily traceable through unique machine identifiers. While in theory hardware-based measures to this effect will be more difficult to overcome than software-based protections, it is likely that they will only delay rather than completely prevent circumvention; as the history of region encoding in DVDs has shown. In fact, hardware manufacturers themselves are often complicit in the development of circumvention measures since insurmountable usage limitations impact negatively on sales. Too heavy-handed approaches to trusted computing are also likely to speed the exodus of users from proprietary platforms towards open source operating systems.

This illustrates the intertwining of business, cultural, and social issues in DRM. The business rules established by software and hardware vendors for content protection can affect consumer rights and use practices in ways which are as relevant to consumer protection law as they are to copyright law. For example, the usage rules associated with rights-managed content are rarely transparent. The widespread use of complex ‘click-through’ or ’shrink-wrap’ licenses - where users are asked to agree to extensive terms and conditions before using digital products - creates uncertainty at the purchase level about fitness-for-purpose.

A deeper concern is privacy. For DRM to work, data associated with identity and authentication must usually be provided to the vendor. However it is difficult for the user (or governments) to monitor how this information will be used and protected. Many consumer groups such as the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) are concerned about the impossibility of anonymous access to content under DRM regimes. Under this scenario, it is unlikely that users will trust a number of smaller providers with their data. There is a clear role for third-party authentication schemes or government intervention in this context - however, this brings with it the danger of excluding better platforms for rights and identity management.

A final issue is whether the desire to protect content through DRM technologies (and the associated legal support) is cost-effective or worthwhile. Technology commentator Mark Pesce claims that users will always find ways to bypass overly restrictive rights management systems, and this has been proven in the history of digital media technologies. Instead, he advocates for the commercial potential of such systems - suggesting that the iTunes model proves that users will happily pay for content if it is delivered at the right price in the most convenient format35. Far from trying to squash Bittorrent, content providers could see it as a massive *investment* by users in the distribution of content.

Working with users

The standard music industry anti-copying slogan ’stealing kills music’ is demonstrably wrong in its overly generalising approach, and is therefore widely dismissed by users - copying does not necessarily equate to stealing, while as a form of additional exposure for artists copying can even help *increase* sales. However, amongst the majors, DRM is currently viewed as a means of preventing or at least severely inconveniencing uses of music that are often seen by a majority of users as customary and acceptable. For example, from the listener’s perspective, duplicating CDs for private use in one’s car does not impact on sales since one does not expect to buy multiple copies of the same CD. However, this experience is not reflected in the rhetoric of industry bodies such as the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft. Their executive director, Adrienne Pecotic, suggests, somewhat implausibly:

“Consumers are not entitled to replacement goods if they break their crystal glasses or stain their new clothes. Once a right exists to create an unprotected copy of a DVD film, that film is then exposed to unrestricted copying, whether a single copy for personal use or 10,000 copies for sale around the world.”36

Quite apart from the common industry hyperbole which sees any one copy as inevitably spinning out of control to become part of a major counterfeit trade, this metaphor is also flawed in that DRM-protected CDs or DVDs should be likened more accurately to crystal glasses which are only able to hold one type of beverage, or clothes which can be worn only at specific hours of the day. DRM-protected CDs or DVDs constitute a product whose uses are so severely restricted that it can be regarded as inherently defective. As a result, the listener experience with DRM is as a strategy that seems greedy. In buying CDs listeners purchase a licence to access intellectual property, and CDs cost twenty times their manufacturing cost due to such intellectual property considerations. But when listeners want to shift this intellectual property to another format for convenience, they are forced to buy the licence again as if a CD was a purely physical product.

However, rather than just making consumers buy things twice because one can, it is possible to use tools developed for DRM for other ways of stimulating the music economy. For example, watermarking of tracks can establish a relationship between a digital audio file and a specific user who may have paid for it. Other users who access this file can be directed to a Website where they are encouraged to buy other tracks, albums, or merchandise. It would be possible for the original user to get a cut on these transactions, providing an encouragement for them to share the track in a way that generates revenue for the artist. At least in the second tier of the music industry, there often exists a strong loyalty between artists (and sometimes labels) and listeners, and such constructive approaches to using DRM may well prove successful where the more standard cease-and-desist belligerence of the mainstream music industry only engenders further animosity and resistance. Another business model could involve tracks that contain advertising, which can be removed on payment. Or unauthorised tracks may even just remind the user of their obligations, relying on a moral incentive.

While the potential models obviously rely on technological solutions, the overwhelming focus on content protection in the industry must be seen in the context of a *lack* of investment in innovative and user-friendly approaches. For the oligopolistic major labels, who make little investment in their own brands for consumer purposes, there is little to fear from consumer backlash against their DRM tactics. Listeners just won’t buy digital music, rather than not buying from BMG or Sony in particular. This represents a great opportunity for independent or artist-run labels who establish stronger presence in consumer consciousness. They may also significantly *profit* from the use of filesharing and other (technically copyright-infringing) technologies as a form of word-of-mouth marketing - it is worth noting in this context that despite claims to the contrary there is little evidence to suggest that filesharing has had any statistically significant effects on music sales.37

According to Audible.com CEO Donald Katz ‘the realm of piracy will diminish most profoundly when the consumer perceives a great product at great prices from good people with well-meaning aspirations’38 and Condry notes that his students reinforce this point when asked ‘Is there some music you would always pay for?’:

Most students said yes. They mentioned indie artists, or artists from their hometown, whom they know ‘need the money’. Some students identified major groups ‘with a solid track record of good albums’. Other students mentioned entire genres of music, notably, jazz and classical music, because ‘they stand the test of time’, and because they are not adequately supported by major record companies.39

Ultimately, then, instead of a continuing, costly, but futile DRM arms race between IP holders and IP users, it would seem more effective to develop a more consensual and cooperative approach to deploying DRM systems. This would include fair pricing and fair usage limitations and a form of DRM policing that is based less on litigation than on encouragement for users to activate the desire to pay for content mentioned by Condry’s students above. It would harness existing user-driven content exchange spaces as means of promoting new content, rather than dismissing them simply as a realm of piracy - in essence, this approach appeals more to users’ ethics rather than their fear of legal retribution.

It is not inconceivable that a deepening split between the sectors will result from this, even leading to the emergence of at least two clearly distinct DRM regimes - one that serves the major label interests, and one more suited to smaller, independent artists or those from smaller economies. While the generally diffused nature of the second tier might hinder effective cooperation on developing new DRM approaches (at least in comparison with the concentrated efforts of the first tier), governments - especially those outside the US - could play an important role in helping the second tier coordinate its efforts. As noted above, the independent and often locally based sector of the music industry is an important contributor to national and regional economies in many countries, and should be supported in areas where its growth is at odds with transnational mainstream music industry interests.

An effective, non-adversarial DRM system, perhaps with ties to collection societies which focus on distributing royalties fairly to artists rather than mainly benefiting the major labels, could sustain local music industries, support widespread DIY cultural production, and halt the current trend to criminalise music users for customary small-scale infringements. Government policy could support such developments, and in the process would also help avoid the emergence of a global DRM monopoly controlled by the major music labels and hardware manufacturers. By contrast, the emergence of this monopoly would provide its operators, which also happen to be the major players in the global music industry, with a means to lock non-compliant content producers out of the market altogether. An interesting policy proposition by Weiser suggests that governments may have a role in supporting ‘competitive platforms’ as part of their innovation policy, whenever there is a chance of a platform monopoly stifling innovation40.

Further alternatives

Pesce mentioned above the self-education of users as a distinctive trait of the contemporary digital environment. Many users have also taught themselves how to, for example, disable region-encoding on their DVD players, block pop-up ads on their Web browser, or check for spyware on their computer - with such success, in fact, that pop-up blockers have now been included as standard features in Internet Explorer and other browsers, and that region encoding can be said to have soundly failed in its mission to maintain geographically separate markets for DVDs. Users do this because they feel they have a right to use the products they have purchased in whatever ways they see fit, and to bypass licensing restrictions that are seen as out of step with their understanding of property. Cory Doctorow[AB4] contrasts the ‘private laws’ (such as region encoding) that have sprung up in the digital environment with the copy protection attached to a book, which can be taken anywhere and sold or given away after use. It is the kind of ‘objectness’ associated with the book or the CD that perhaps provides the model for how we expect our digital content to behave.

However, in the digital environment the competing standards of possible file types, DRM systems and operating systems further complicates the market for content. This interoperability is one of the key challenges facing content providers today, and the work of Europe’s High Level Group on DRM reiterated its importance41. Interoperability between devices and platforms is needed to allow customary uses such as time and space shifting, but also to reduce the risk of customers losing access to their purchases if software and hardware become obsolete, a significant barrier to trust in e-content. Unfortunately, manufacturers and content owners have short-term incentives to create proprietary DRM systems that do not interoperate with others (maintaining barriers to entry and protection of incumbent market positions).

This is due to a phenomenon called suboptimisation, where the individual interests of actors in some imperfect markets result in a less beneficial outcome than would otherwise be possible. In this case, DRM might reduce total market and social good, but industries will still pursue it. ‘This is due to the fact that price discrimination [available through DRM] increases the ability of a producer to appropriate a larger proportion of the surplus created. Thus, it is possible that while total surplus might decline, a producer’s profits might increase’42. However, through incentives to collaborate, a larger overall surplus may be able to be obtained. But as Bremer and Buhse point out, another reason for the lack of common DRM standards is that the requirements are very different at different points of the value chain, and so the different stakeholders have conflicting views on what would constitute a viable DRM system43.

William Fisher makes the strongest argument for a system that will overcome the economic issues of suboptimisation that come from privatised public goods44. He shows that a levy system could be devised that would fairly compensate artists while reducing transaction costs for music listeners. However, while his scheme benefits many in the digital music ecology, it does not benefit the long term strategic dominance of the major players, which greatly reduces the likelihood that it will be taken up in the current political and economic environment. Nevertheless, Fisher includes a role for DRM systems in tracking usage, which could be of great benefit to independent artists, labels, and collecting societies. What seems more likely, however, is that usage tracking mechanisms are employed to determine compensation among the rights holders and distribution partners, without recourse to public good requirements.

This is an area where collecting societies have been trying to position themselves as well placed to manage the process of collection and distribution. However, whenever collection societies attempt to position themselves as intermediaries, there is a swift response from the industry. In Australia, the Australasian Performing Right Associaton (APRA), representing songwriters and publishers, has called for a Canadian-style levy on blank CDs, DVDs and digital music players to compensate artists for the effects of copying. However, the Australian Record Industry Association tends to view such solutions as both unnecessary and a legitimation of copying it sees as simply illegal.45.

CONCLUSIONS

Wallis et al. believe that the shift of copyright revenues from physical distribution to intellectual property rights will benefit IPR owners, with the “danger that the revenue distribution of IPRs will only be safe for the most successful artists and largest record companies, and that barriers to entry will be erected against smaller companies and less known entrepreneurs.”46 With the majors controlling 80% of the revenues flowing through the collecting agency system, there is a strong economic incentive for them to gradually withdraw from this system in favour of their own arrangements. It appears that DRM is likely to bring a massive transformation in the entire infrastructure of music circulation.

The interplay of technical and legal barriers to use through DRM leaves the consumer with digital music systems that:

a) prevent consumptive uses which should be allowable under fair use/dealing provisions,

b) lack workable provisions to exercise legal exemptions,

c) have contractual restrictions on legal exemptions that would otherwise be available47,

d) are not usable on many free operating systems, and

e) require tightly integrated hardware and software (”trusted computing”), leading to “digital lock up” - a reduction in user choice of technology.

While there are no simple solutions to these troubling issues, we can note three broad strategies that must be addressed to achieve a viable future for digital music.

The first is a review of copyright law, in light of the fact that in light of the fact that copyright developed in very different social and technological situations, with differently commodified relations between producers and consumers than we have today. Copyright law defines the rights of rights holders of a work, but not the rights of users. There is a need for “enforceable consumer rights” that are not infringed by DRM, click-wrap licenses etc.

The second is to address the low level of consumer and consumer-advocate involvement in discussions with respect to Digital Rights Management. While this burden primarily falls to technology and content companies who must take user rights more seriously, there is also an important role for government and academic bodies in brokering discussions across the domains of business, policy, artistic creation, and end users. It will be the through the formation of shared understanding - as opposed to defensive tactics - that the prospect of successful Digital Rights Management will emerge.

The third and final strategy falls to governments: it points to the need to support alternative platforms for rights-managed digital content. This would ideally be directed to the needs of local or independent producers for the purposes of supporting creative and economic development. But even more importantly, it will mean that a monopoly situation is avoided and more control is retained over policy-making for cultural and economic objectives. A monopoly DRM environment truly functions as private law, and the laws governing the social and economic future of our creative sector are too important to outsource to overseas technology and entertainment companies.

1 * Corresponding Author. Danny Butt was employed by QUT for this project, which received funding from a Queensland University of Technology Strategic Initiatives Grant.

2 INDICARE, Digital Rights Management and Consumer Acceptability. A Multi-Disciplinary Discussion of Consumer Concerns and Expectations. (2004) <http://www.indicare.org/soareport> at 20th January 2005.

3 Ibid 73.

4 Lawrence Lessing, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999).

5 Sherman Young and Steve Collins, ‘Fair Enough? Copyright and the Australia - United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2004) (Paper presented at the Mobile Boundaries / Rigid Worlds : The Contemporary Paradox, Macquarie University, Sydney, 28th September).

6 Kimberlee Weatherall, ‘Locked In - Australia Gets a Bad Intellectual Property Deal’ (2004) 20 (4) Policy 18-24.

7 Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use and Digital Rights Management: Preliminary Thoughts on the (Irreconcilable?) Tension Between Them (2002) Electronic Frontier Foundation at November 20 2004.

8 See Danny Butt, Report on Digital Rights Management and Cooperation Seminar (2004) Association for Progressive Communications <http://rights.apc.org.au/culture/2004/10/report_digital_rights.php> at 29 October 2004.

9 Ibid.

10 See, eg, Frank Rose, ‘The Civil War inside Sony’ (2003) 11 (2) Wired. <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/sony.html> at 28 April 2005.

11 See, eg, Otomar J. Bartos, ‘ Postmodernism, postindustrialism, and the future’ (1996) 37 (2) The Sociological Quarterly 307-326; Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York London and Tokyo Updated Edition (2000) [1991]

12 Wallis, Roger, Charles Baden-Fuller, Martin Kretschmer, and George Michael Klimis. ‘Contested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music The Challenge to the Principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity’ (1999) 14 (1) European Journal of Communication, 6.

13 A similar ‘major’/'minor’ dichotomy also became highly visible in the recent conflicts over Webcasting royalty frameworks in the United States - see, eg, Axel Bruns, Fight for Survival: The RIAA’s Sustained Attack on Streaming Media (2004) M/C Journal <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0302/07-fightforsurvival.php> at 28 April 2005.

14 Interview with Murray Jeffrey, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (Auckland, 19 October 2004).

15 Allen Consulting, An Integrated Approach for the Australian Contemporary Music Industry (2004) <http://www.allenconsult.com.au/contemporary_music> at November 2 2004.

16 Abraham Ninan, Kate Oakley and Greg Hearn, Queensland Music Industry Trends: Independence Day?, ISBN: 1 74107 056 2 (2004) 29.

17 Robert Fripp, DGM’s Founding Aims and Mission Statement (1997) <http://www.disciplineglobalmobile.com/foundingaims.shtml> at 28 April 2005.

18 Bruce Schneier, Secrets And Lies: Digital Security In A Networked World (2000), 252-3.

19 Webcasters tried unsuccessfully to use this exemption to argue for a corresponding exemption for online music transmissions during the bitter Webcast royalty disputes of 2002 - See, eg, Stephen H. Wildstrom Royalties: A Royal Pain for Net Radio (2002) <http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2002/nf20020329_5377.htm> at 28 April 2005.

20 Paul Petrick, Why DRM Should be Cause for Concern: An Economic and Legal Analysis of the Effect of Digital Technology on the Music Industry, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School Research Publication No. 2004-09. (2004), 20.

21 Interview with Andrew Garton, (Melbourne, December 7 2004).

22 Cory Doctorow, ‘New Beasties disc has DRM’ (2004) <http://www.boingboing.net/2004/06/11/new_beasties_disc_ha.html> at 23 March 2005.

23 Snafu, ‘Wu-ming: 54: Re:inter:view’, 2 _ØYES make-world-paper_ (November 2002) 4. <http://195.169.149.109/download/paper2.pdf> at 6 October 2005.

24 Charles Leadbeater, Living on thin air: the new economy (2000).

25 John Howkins, The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas (2001).

26 Charles Leadbeater, ‘Open Innovation and the Creative Industries’ (2004) (Lecture at Creative Industries Research and Application Centre, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 2 March).

27 Axel Bruns, Gatewatching: Collaborative Online News Production (2005).

28 http://creativecommons.org/

29 Interview with Brian Fitzgerald, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology (Brisbane, March 6 2005). The language of “user rights” has caused some controversy, but support can be found in, eg, the Copyright and Contract review of the Copyright Law Review Committee, available at <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/clrHome.nsf/AllDocs/RWP092E76FE8AF2501CCA256C44001FFC28?OpenDocument>. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

30 Associated with the intellectual property provisions of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, the Australian Government is currently engaged in a review of the fair dealing provisions in Australian copyright law. See for example the issues paper Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions: An examination of fair use, fair dealing and other exceptions in the Digital Age (2005) <http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/agdhome.nsf/0/E63BC2D5203F2D29CA256FF8001584D7?OpenDocument> at October 6 2005.

31 Petrick, above n 20, 11.

32 Tim Jackson, Comments on the Informal Consultation of the Final Report of the High Level Group on DRM of the European Commission, DG Information Society (2004) <http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/doc/jackson_tim.pdf> at March 20 2005.

33 INDICARE, above n 1, 24.

34 F. Hill Slowinski, What consumers want in Digital Rights Management (DRM). Making content as widely available as possible in ways that satisfy consumer preferences. (2003) <http://doi.contentdirections.com/mr/aap.jsp?doi=10.1003/whitepaper1> at March 25 2005.

35 Interview with Mark Pesce, (Sydney, 15th February 2005).

36 Adam Turner, ‘Do you copy?’ (2004) <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/09/15/1095221649806.html> at September 16 2004

37 See, eg, Suw Charman, Listen to the Flip Side (2004) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/online/story/0,3605,1265840,00.html/> at 28 April 2005.

38 David Becker, An Ear for Downloads (2004) <http://news.com.com/2008-1025-5317234.html> at April 20 2004.

39 Ian Condry, ‘Cultures of music piracy An ethnographic comparison of the US and Japan’ 7 (3) International journal of Cultural Studies 347.

40 Philip J. Weiser, ‘The Internet, Innovation, And Intellectual Property Policy’ (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 534-614.

41 See for example the overview comments on the website of the EU’s High Level Group at <http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/digital_rights_man/high_level_group/index_en.htm> at October 5 2005.

42 Petrick, above n 20, 28.

43 Oliver Bremer and Willms Buhse, ‘Standardization in DRM - Trends and Recommendations’ (2003) 2770 (November 2003) Lecture Notes in Computer Science 334 - 343

44 William W. Fisher, Promises to keep: technology, law, and the future of entertainment (2004).

45 Julian Lee, Click at your own risk. (2004) <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/08/02/1091432115074.htm> at 3 August 2004.

46 Wallis et al, above n 12, 8.

47 INDICARE, above n 2, 70

Services, The Knowledge Economy, and Information Technologies - Emerging Themes and Research Agendas

Draft of article forthcoming in “Services and the Knowlege Economy - Issues and Perspectives”, ICFAI University Press, Hyderabad 2006.

In this brief sketch, I argue that emerging discussions in the “services sector”, “knowledge economy” and the emerging role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) contain important, under-explored links. These relationships can help develop new models to better understand the emerging economic environment, and I hope researchers and policy-makers will be stimulated to look afresh at questions of technology, economic development and innovation.

Summaries of the service economy, knowledge economy, or role of ICTs in innovation routinely begin with a complaint around existing economic taxonomies and methodologies. Economic historians and certain fields of information economics have interrogated the erroneous assumptions about knowledge and information implicit in neo-classical economic theory (see Lamberton (2002, 1996) for an overview of this literature). For example, economists work from the assumption that knowledge generally transcends specific social contexts, while much of the empirical evidence suggests that firms are not given units of coordinating ability, but are instead limited in their decisions by their capabilities, knowledge, and learning (Mokyr, 2002). The findings have been significant enough that Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz claimed that “standard economic theory has little to say about the efficiency of the knowledge-based economy.” (Stiglitz quoted in Lamberton, 2002).

While ICTs received an inordinate amount of attention during the 1990s, they were often considered in isolation to the rest of the economy. ICTs face similar accounting problems to services: ICTs are often seen as an industry “sector”, but this sector is difficult to define and their true value lies in the way they transform existing economic relationships. The real material of much intellectual property in ICTs lies in the contextual information embedded into the product and the way it improves productivity in non-ICT areas. For example practice management software for healthcare providers may use quite generic technology and programming techniques, but the value hinges on the authors’ understanding of the healthcare business

Services have been similarly undervalued. Both Karl Marx and Adam Smith considered services to be not directly productive, and this has constrained the way economists perceive the role of services in contemporary economies. For example, services are usually defined negatively: in macroeconomic discourse services are often still considered to be that which isn’t agriculture and manufacturing. Yet services (like ICTs) are major enablers for other productive sectors as well as discrete market sectors of their own. International trade is made feasible only through the services sector - for example, according to Adam Smith (1986 [1776]) it was growth in insurance services that allowed growth in international shipping to occur. Much value in the contemporary economy can be traced to services.

Why services are important

Despite the growing importance and complexity of services, their definition has remained the same in mainstream economics since proposed by Fisher and Clark back in the 1930s. A distinction is drawn between services which are “intangible, invisible and perishable”, and simultaneously produced and consumed, while goods or products are thought of as tangible and storable. However, the effects of services can be long-lasting, as in education or medical services, while goods are increasingly disposable in use as consumption increases (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1998).

Metcalf and Miles (2000) define services as activities directed at creating changes or transformation in some entities. This transformation can be of, for example, people or objects; through time, space, or nature. This is a very general definition! However, this definition allows services some tangibility, and also clarifies the significant distinction between the production of services and their consumption. For example, the value of goods is much more stable than services, where the producer and consumer (or consumers themselves) may have vastly different ideas about the benefits or value of a particular service. The ability to evaluate a good deal in the services economy is highly dependent on information and cognitive skills.

These factors make it difficult to find appropriate methodologies to measure the quality, efficiency, and productivity of services. For example, how productive is a bank, and what does it actually produce? Is it more productive if it produces more loans? Or is a bank’s productivity better measured by the productivity of its customers?

It may be due to these issues that the “productivity paradox” applies to both ICT and service industries. We know an increased share for services in a country’s GDP is a marker of highly developed economies, yet service industries themselves have “low productivity” by traditional measures. According to Andersen and Corley (2002) services account for roughly 75% of highly industrialised economies and have grown their economic share markedly over the last few decades. Yet services are also often accounted for as a cost rather than investment, despite knowledge-intensive business services such as consulting and financial services having a major impact on growth and productivity in firms. Services probably play an even bigger role in economic growth than we currently believe. If services are as important to economies as the research indicates, the errors in measurement will be radically skewing GDP figures in national accounts. This has significant implications for government policy when attempting to measure performance in emerging information economies.

The Knowledge Economy

In referring to informational environments distinctions are usually drawn between three forms: data, information, and knowledge.
Beer (1985) provides a useful overview from systems theory, suggesting that:

  • Data are symbols that have not yet been subject to interpretation, they are “statements of fact”.
  • Information refers to data that has been assigned a meaning. Beer(1985); p. 283) describes information as “that which changes us” - data becomes information when it can be acted upon. Insofar as information can be considered in the abstract, it is always linked to a specific situation and has only limited validity (van der Spek & Spijkervet, 1997).
  • Knowledge is what enables people to assign meaning to data and thereby generate information. It includes insights, experiences and procedures and guide people’s thoughts, behaviour and communication. Knowledge is usually applicable in a range of situations and is durable over a period of time (van der Spek & Spijkervet, 1997)

Saskia Sassen claims that consensus is emerging around distinguishing two types of information critical to a global economy:

“One is the datum, which may be complex yet is standard knowledge: the level at which a stock market closes, a privatisation of a public utility, the bankruptcy of a bank. But there is a far more difficult type of “information”, akin to an interpretation/evaluation/judgement [what Beer calls “knowledge” - DB]… Access to the first kind of information is now global and immediate from just about any place in the highly developed world … But the second type of information requires a mixture of elements, which we could think of as the social infrastructure for global connectivity….It is possible, in principle, to reproduce the technical infrastructure anywhere, but the same cannot be asserted for specialised kinds of social connectivity.” (Sassen, 2002 p.22)

For Sassen, it is access to this second kind of information that gives cities and urban environments a competitive advantage in the market. The city provides a high concentration of information workers supported by a feminised and low-paid informational labour force. This division of labour forms part of the “necessary social infrastructure” for firms which undertake internationally dispersed, information-intensive production under capitalism, which emphasises control. According to Sassen, the distinctive way information facilitates dispersal of routine information activities and centralisation of control activities explains the increasing dominance of cities over rural areas in global economic activity. (Sassen, 1991)

The Role of ICTs and Services in the Knowledge Economy

It is also notable that the highest level of service activity and ICT use takes place in urban centres where Sassen’s “knowledge infrastructure” is in place. Services are knowledge intensive, usually based on a range of “immaterial inputs” including cultural and aesthetic knowledge, know-how, social and organisational knowledge, information-based knowledge, and science and technology knowledge. However, services require more knowledge resources than just those of the producer. Generally, there is no service without the knowledge of the customer. This can be illustrated by the example of educational services: a teacher can be in a classroom teaching one student, which is an educational service. If that student leaves, no service is being provided, as the teaching experience cannot be stockpiled as inventory. The rise of services displaying this logic has contributed to the process by which economies are said to be “consumption-led”. Primarily tacit or uncodified knowledge (such as preferences) in markets and ‘quasi-generic’ knowledge in firms combine and are given economic value in new services.

Information and Communication Technologies are central to development of the new services economy. ICT innovations facilitate “appropriability” (tangibility) of specific problem-solving methodologies, through dissemination and the provision of standard interfaces to knowledge. In this way, ICTs enable inter-locality exchange of information and thus trade in services, which were previously thought of as immobile (Andersen & Corley, 2002).

From an innovation perspective, ICTs and services are redefining research and development (R&D) as we know it. Service industries have a collective learning model - innovation resides in the client-purchaser network rather than specific firms. Service production is reflexive, incorporating constant feedback from the network without a formal ‘R&D’ stage (Ragazzi & Rolfo, 2002) This matches a shifting emphasis in the ICT sector away from “pure engineering” to user-led product development. Effective feedback between the design of product and process is increasingly important in ICT innovation (note e.g. the increasing importance of HCI, human factors and interface design), making technology “products” increasingly more like services.

In advanced industrialised nations these processes are so pronounced that some commentators have suggested that we have entered a post-scarcity economy, where there is no longer a shortage of goods, but shortage of goods with right service inputs such as marketing, design, strategic management (see e.g. Romer, 1990). More critical voices, especially from outside the US/UK, note not only that there are many who still cannot afford basic food, water and shelter; but that the question of immaterial value in advanced societies always relies in some way on the material production of less-advanced societies. The focus on measuring nation-states in macroeconomics (rather than transnational processes) is central to to maintaining this illusion of the “weightless economy” (Leadbeater, 2000).

International trade in services

Services tend to be heterogeneous and customised. Scale does not equate with value as strongly as in agriculture or manufacturing - the size of financial investment in knowledge-intensive services may be poor predictor of likely profitability (Caves, 2000). Where economies of scale are possible is in distribution, which Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) dominate by organising individual units into chains and managing them through centralised or decentralised (or both) networks (Clairmonte & Cavanagh, 1984). This poses serious challenges for countries without large MNEs when attempting to gain a foothold in the emergent transnational markets for services.

An important issue in global capital flows around information and services relates to the differing legal capabilities of multinational corporations and individuals to exploit global networks. In the employment relationship, Christopher May notes that “there is an important distinction between property-owning classes and those who work for them… with considerable barriers to individuals profiting from the ideas and knowledge they generate” (May, 2002). Tactics include the capture of subcontractor’s creative ideas and labour, and defensive use of the copyright and patent system to ensure commercialisation costs remain high (or legal risks prohibitive). There is increasing legal activity centred around limiting the mobility of technical personnel to competitive firms (which remains defined ver